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ABSTRACT  
This study investigates the gender composition of the boards of directors of Australian 
property trust IPOs from 1994 to 2004. Like mining and industrial company IPOs, we find 
that property trust IPOs in Australia generally do not require female directors for the 
initial equity capital raising.  We also find that larger IPOs during 1994 to 1999 tended to 
engage more women directors but that this relation was not significant in property trust 
IPOs from 2000 to 2004.   
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INTRODUCTION  
Over the last twenty years, the management literature has suggested that companies would 
benefit by engaging women on their boards of directors (Burke 1994, Burke 1997). 
Bilimoria (2000) presents a case that having women on boards is desirable business 
practice because it is likely to improve the reputation of the firm, the strategic direction 
(by better understanding women s issues that may impact on such direction) and to 
contribute positively to the company s female employees.   
While employing women directors on boards may be constructive and beneficial to the 
operation of boards of directors, Dimovski and Brooks (2004) provide evidence of a 
relatively low proportion of female directors on the boards of Australian mining and 
industrial company IPOs. This study extends that work by examining 58 property trust 
IPOs during 1994 to 2004 that subsequently listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. The 
study specifically investigates the Australian IPO data to determine whether the Singh, 
Vinnicombe and Johnson (2001) in the UK and Catalyst (2003) in the US findings that 
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larger entities employ more women directors hold. The study also investigates whether 
office or retail property trust sectors employ more women and whether female 
representation on the board may have altered over time.  While the gender composition of 
the boards of many industry sectors (such as retailing, banking, health, utilities and media 
and publishing) has been examined (see for example Singh, Vinnicombe and Johnson 
(2001)), the gender composition of the boards of listed property trusts (LPTs) is yet to be 
reported.   
The LPT sector is a significant industry sector by holding over $100 billion in property 
assets, over $60 billion in net assets (Property Investment Research, 2004) and accounting 
for around $73 billion (or 8%) of the capitalized value of the Australian stock market 
(UBS Warburg, 2004). As an IPO industry sector, Dimovski and Brooks (2005a) report 
that it was Australia s second largest industry sector in terms of public equity capital 
raised during 1994 to 1999 and second only because of the Australian Government s 
partial sale of Telstra. Excluding the Telstra float, property trust IPOs raised twice the 
public equity capital of any single industry sector and more than twice the equity raised by 
mining and resources IPOs.  
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly summarises some previous gender 
composition findings and explains this study. Section 3 advances the model and reports 
the findings. Section 4 contains our conclusions.  
PREVIOUS GENDER COMPOSITION FINDINGS AND THIS STUDY  
Burke (1997), Bilimoria (2000), Burke (2003) and Stephenson (2004) all explain in detail 
the competitive advantage benefits that can be enjoyed by firms employing women on 
boards of directors. They point to women having an intimate knowledge of consumer 
markets and customers and to women being innovative but also socially and community 
minded. In terms of corporate financial performance, Catalyst (2004) reports on 353 
Fortune 500 companies in the United States on which at least four years of financial 
performance data is available over the years 1996 to 2000. They found that companies 
with the highest representation of women on their top management teams had a 35% 
better return on equity and a 34% better total return to shareholders than those companies 
with the lowest women s representation. Farrell and Hirsch (2005) also find that women 
tend to serve on better performing boards.   
Despite the evidence of benefits regarding women in top management, the international 
evidence suggests relatively few women on the boards of publicly listed companies. In 
Australia, Sheridan (2002) finds that women represent only around 3% of the boards of 
Australian listed companies. In the United Kingdom, Singh and Vinnicombe (2003) report 
women constitute only 7.6% of all directors of the top 100 publicly listed companies. In 
the United States, Catalyst (2003) reports 13.6% of board seats in the Fortune 500 are held 
by women (compared to 12.4% in 2001 and 9.6% in 1995). Interestingly, Singh and 
Vinnicombe (2003) report the governments of Scandinavian countries (Norway and 
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Sweden) find such low representation percentages unacceptable and have now legislated 
for greater female representation.   
Singh and Vinnicombe (2004) provide some possible insight into the relatively low 
female representation. They argue that male directors prefer directors like themselves just 
as social identity theory would suggest. Successful women directors, they suggest, appear 
to have significant corporate backgrounds and experience, like their male counterparts. In 
a similar vein, Sheridan (2002) suggests the low representation of women on boards could 
be due to them not having sufficient influential contact with other board members.   
This study investigates the gender composition of the boards of property trusts on the 
occasion of their IPO. The pre-IPO owners appoint the board of directors of the IPO firm 
at the time of preparing the prospectus. While Mak and Roush (2000) would suggest it is 
in the interests of the pre-IPO owners to select a board with appropriate attributes, Burke 
(2003) argues that an appropriate board should include qualified women directors. In an 
examination of the gender composition of boards of IPOs generally, Dimovski and Brooks 
(2004) identify that women represent only 4% of the boards of industrial and mining 
company IPOs that listed in Australia during 1994 to 1997. In a later study, Dimovski and 
Brooks (2005b) report no significant change in the gender composition of the boards of 
large Australian industrial and mining companies some five to eight years after listing. 
This study investigates the gender composition of the boards of 58 Australian property 
trust initial public offerings (IPOs) during 1994 to 2004 and examines firm size influences 
and property trust sector influences. The total amount of public equity capital raised over 
this period was $8.417 billion. Three hypotheses are formally advanced and tested with 
regard the proportions of male directors and female directors at IPO time.   
The relationship between the number of women directors and company size (measured 
usually by market capitalization) has been reported by Catalyst (2003) in the US and 
Singh, Vinnicombe and Johnson (2001) in the UK. Hyland and Marcellino (2002) also 
found that larger organizations measured by revenues employ more women directors. 
Luoma and Goodstein (1999) also argue that larger organizations are subject to greater 
public and media attention and hence larger firms need to be seen to have a higher 
proportion of women directors. This leads to the following hypothesis:  
H1: The proportion, existence and/or number of women directors on a property trust s 
board is greater in larger (measured by market capitalization) entities.  
Singh, Vinnicombe and Johnson (2001) report that women directors in the UK are 
particularly found in retailing and banking (where a high percentage of the workforce are 
women) and also in health, media/publishing and utilities. The office property trust sector 
and the retail property trust sector had 17 and 11 IPO listings respectively over the period 
of the study. Given the significant number employed by retailers and the finding of many 
women directors in retailing companies, we might expect a greater proportion of women 
directors in the retail trusts to add some female understanding of consumers and consumer 
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markets as Stephenson (2004) suggests. Similarly, many women work in offices as 
employees, managers or even directors. We investigate if the proportion of women 
directors is higher in retail and/or office trust sectors.   The following hypothesis is tested:  
H2: The proportion, existence and/or number of women directors on a property trust s 
board is greater in retail and/or office trust sectors.  
Dimovski and Brooks (2005c) report on the gender composition of boards of 37 property 
trust IPOs for 1994 to 1999. This paper extends the dataset by another 21 property trust 
IPOs for 2000 to 2004 to determine if more women are board members in more recent 
times, given the continued discussion on the benefits of having women directors. 
Additionally up until the end of 1999, Australia also had a Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission (HREOC) that heard cases and imposed penalties for breaches 
of the law in the areas of human rights, equal opportunity and sex discrimination but the 
penalties were not enforceable. The Federal Government in 1999 transferred HREOC 
hearing powers to the Federal and Magistrates courts who could impose enforceable 
penalties from 2000 onwards.  
H3: The possible explanatory variables influencing the proportion, existence and/or 
number of women directors on a property trust s board has altered in more recent times.  
FINDINGS  
The primary source of the IPO data was the Connect 4 Company Prospectuses database. 
Gender data was located in each of the prospectuses of the property trust IPOs. Our 
sample group of 58 trusts during 1994 to 2004 consists of 17 clearly and distinctively 
Office property trusts, 11 clearly and distinctively Retail property trusts and 30 others 
involved in hotel, industrial, leisure or diversified activities. Table 1 reports details of 
board composition by gender for our property trust IPOs. The number of female directors 
was only 12 (or about 3.8%) of our 320 trust director population. Only five female 
directors were found amongst the Office trusts while only one female director was found 
amongst the Retail property trusts.  For the 1994 to 1999 period of 37 property trust IPOs, 
the number of female directors was 7 (or about 3.3%) of the 214 trust director population 
for this period. Only two female directors were found amongst the Office trusts, while no 
female directors were found amongst the Retail property trusts in the 1994 to 1999 period.       
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Table 1: Board composition by gender   
Sample size  58 Trusts  Whole sample: 1994 2004 Property Trust IPOs 
   
No. of  
Directors  
Office Trusts   
Directors  
Retail 
Trusts 
Directors 
Female Directors  12     
(3.8%)  
5       
(5.1%)  
1    
(1.7%) 
Male Directors  308    
(96.2%)  
93    
(94.9%)  
58 
(98.3%) 
Total Directors  320   
(100.0%)  
98 
(100.0%)  
59 
(100.0%) 
Table 2 reports some further descriptive statistics for our data. While the mean size of the 
IPO property trust board was 5.52, the median IPO board size was 6. The proportions of 
women and men directors are also reported.   
Table 2: Board size and proportions of women and men directors   
Sample size  58 Trusts    
1994 2004 
Property Trust IPOs 
Mean  Median  Standard Deviation 
Board Size (members) 5.52 6 1.69 
Proportion of Women 
Directors 
0.038 0 0.07 
Proportion of Men Directors 0.962 1 0.07 
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We use multiple approaches to explore the relationship between the proportion of female 
directors, the existence of female directors and the number of female directors (as the 
dependent variables) and various explanatory variables. The four approaches, or models 
are an ordinary least squares regression model (OLS), a probit model, a tobit model and a 
poisson regression. The explanatory variables examined are defined as follows:  
LNMKTCAP  is the natural log of the market capitalization of the company given the 
issue price and issue size of the IPO [adapted from Singh, Vinnicombe 
and Johnson (2001) and Hyland and Marcellino (2002)];   
RETAIL1       A (0 or1) variable with a value of 1 if the IPO was a Retail property trust or 
0 if not  [adapted from Singh, Vinnicombe and Johnson (2001)];  
OFFICE1      A (0 or 1) variable with a value of 1 if the IPO is an Office property trust or 
0 if not.   
The first model run was an OLS regression with the proportion of female directors as the 
dependent variable. The proportion is calculated as the number of female directors in the 
numerator and board size in the denominator. While proportions rather than binary values 
of the number of female directors are used in the OLS model to better test a linear 
relationship, a major limitation is that the fitted probabilities in OLS can be less than zero 
and more than one while our actual data set has a limited dependent variable from zero to 
one (or zero to two if we explore the actual number of women directors in a firm). To 
assist in exploring the dependent variable whose range of values is restricted, three other 
models are run and the results reported: a probit model was run with female directors as 
the dependent variable and was coded as 0 for cases with no women directors and 1 for 
cases with women directors; a tobit model was run with female directors as the dependent 
variable and coded as 0 for cases with no women directors or the actual number of women 
directors in each IPO; a poisson regression which requires the dependent, or count 
variable, to be discrete.  
Tables 3 and 4 investigate the three hypotheses over two time periods of IPOs, 1994 to 
1999 and then 2000 to 2004 respectively.  The models test whether the proportions, 
existence or number of female directors at the time of the IPO are explained by the firm s 
size in terms of market capitalization or by the property trust sector in which the firm 
operates. As measures of goodness of fit, we report R squared, McFadden R squared and 
log likelihood as appropriate. Standard regression diagnostics were calculated for the 
models applied to the data. A Jarque-Bera test for normality, a White test for 
heteroscedasticity and a Ramsey Reset test are performed as necessary on the data and are 
available on request. The results of these diagnostic tests help confirm that our broad 
findings are valid.  
Table 3 for property trust IPOs over 1994 to 1999 shows that the coefficients and 
probabilities of LNMKTCAP and RETAIL1 are statistically significant. This suggests if 
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we consider firms that vary in size (LNMKTCAP), but are comparable in the type of trust, 
larger trusts tended to employ proportionally more women directors. In addition, if we 
consider similar sized trusts, Retail trust IPOs tended to employ fewer female directors.    
Table 3: Possible determinants of women directors in property trust IPOs: 1994 to 
1999 using OLS, probit, tobit and poisson   
Property  
Trust IPOs  
OLS *  Probit  Tobit  Poisson  
  
Dependent 
Variable 
Dependent 
Variable 
Dependent 
Variable 
Dependent 
 Variable 
(n=37)     
Proportion 
of Women 
Directors 
Women 
Dir s = 1 No 
Women 
Dir s = 0 
Number of 
Women 
directors  
Number of 
 Women 
directors 
Independent 
Variable                            
    
C Coef. -0.398 -13.904 -19.725 -17.440 
Pr. 0.000 0.069 0.102 0.088 
LNMKTCAP Coef. 0.025 0.733 1.043 0.898 
Pr. 0.042 0.079 0.109 0.105 
RETAIL1 Coef. -0.071 -8.716 -13.188 -40.188 
Pr. 0.026 1.000 1.000 1.000 
OFFICE1 Coef. 0.053 -1.110 -1.686 -1.629 
Pr. 0.145 0.127 0.133 0.113 
R squared  0.190  0.145 0.142 
McFadden R Sq   0.249   
Log Likelihood   -12.319 -18.404 -15.399 
* White (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent coefficients and p-values are reported   
Table 4 for property trust IPOs over 2000 to 2004 shows that the coefficients and 
probabilities of LNMKTCAP and RETAIL1 are not statistically significant, but that the 
OFFICE1 variable is statistically significant. This suggests if we consider similar sized 
trusts, Office trust IPOs tended to employ more female directors.     
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Table 4: Possible determinants of women directors in Property Trust IPOs: 2000 to 
2004 using OLS, probit, tobit and poisson  
Property Trust 
IPOs  
OLS  Probit  Tobit  Poisson  
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Dependent 
Variable 
Dependent 
Variable 
Dependent 
Variable 
(n=21)     
Proportion 
of Women 
Directors 
Women 
Dir s = 1 No 
Women 
Dir s = 0 
Number of 
Women 
directors  
Number of 
Women 
directors 
Independent 
Variable                            
    
C Coef. -0.260 3.426 2.449 3.206 
Pr. 0.426 0.447 0.639 0.679 
LNMKTCAP Coef. -0.014 -0.284 -0.219 -0.343 
Pr. 0.046 0.405 0.475 0.453 
RETAIL1 Coef. 0.118 2.215 2.012 2.903 
Pr. 0.174 0.115 0.127 0.143 
OFFICE1 Coef. 0.140 2.139 1.915 2.591 
Pr. 0.017 0.027 0.038 0.050 
R squared  0.314  0.426 0.468 
McFadden R Sq   0.305   
Log Likelihood   -8.007 -12.140 -9.577 
While the structural break in timing from 1994 to 1999 and then from 2000 to 2004 is 
interesting and plausible, we also prepared Table 5 which reports the findings of the 
models for all 58 property trust IPOs over the eleven year time horizon. This table is not 
encouraging in terms of the possible determinants of women directors of property trust 
IPOs. Regrettably, none of the three variables selected are statistically significant.         
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Table 5: Possible determinants of women directors in property trust IPOs: 1994 to  
2004 using OLS, probit, tobit and poisson  
Property Trust 
IPOs  
OLS  Probit  Tobit  Poisson  
1994 to 2004  
Dependent 
Variable 
Dependent 
Variable 
Dependent 
Variable 
Dependent 
Variable 
(n=58)     
Proportion 
of Women 
Directors 
Women 
Dir s = 1 No 
Women 
Dir s = 0 
Number of 
Women 
directors  
Number of 
Women 
directors 
Independent 
Variable                            
      
C Coef. -0.129 -5.210 -8.243 -7.660 
Pr. 0.498 0.168 0.171 0.178 
LNMKTCAP Coef. 0.009 0.239 0.383 0.341 
Pr. 0.392 0.257 0.243 0.281 
RETAIL1 Coef. -0.028 -0.690 -1.150 -1.235 
Pr. 0.389 0.304 0.274 0.283 
OFFICE1 Coef. 0.053 0.166 0.163 -0.047 
Pr. 0.643 0.726 0.818 0.948 
R squared  0.046  0.018 0.031 
McFadden R Sq   0.060   
Log Likelihood   -26.488 -37.010 -30.245 
CONCLUSION  
The findings in this study extend Dimovski and Brooks (2004) to now include the 
property trust sector in the analysis of the gender composition of boards of IPOs. The low 
proportion of women directors in property trust IPOs is strikingly similar to the low 
proportion of women directors in industrial and mining company IPOs. It appears that in 
terms of raising public equity, the Australian capital market is satisfied with this low 
proportion of women directors in IPO firms generally. From 1994 to 1999, this study also 
finds that larger property trust IPOs were likely to employ a higher proportion of women 
directors, while Retail property trust IPOs offered fewer opportunities for women to 
achieve directorships. These relations were however not statistically evident in the 
following years of 2000 to 2004.  
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